17th September 2025

Across the UK, one man is taking on a system he believes has twisted the Freedom of Information Act into a weapon—not a shield. Alan M. Dransfield, campaigner and whistle-blower, has spent more than a decade fighting what he calls the misuse of Section 14(1) FOIA, and what has since become known as the “Dransfield Vexatious Precedent.”

What is Section 14(1), and what is the “Dransfield” Precedent?

Section 14(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 allows public authorities to refuse FOI requests that are vexatious—requests that place a disproportionate burden, or are otherwise unjustified, inappropriate, or improper uses of the formal procedure. panopticonblog.com+4pdpjournals.com+4ICO+4

The Dransfield case (Dransfield & Anor v The Information Commissioner & Anor, 2015, Court of Appeal) became a landmark ruling: it confirmed that not only must the content of a request be considered, but also the past behaviour of the requester; the tone, volume, motive, and the burden on the authority are all relevant in determining whether a request may be refused as vexatious. pdptraining.com+3panopticonblog.com+311KBW+3

Some key legal points confirmed in that precedent:

  • The test for vexatiousness is high: the requester must show a “reasonable foundation” for believing the requested information has value to the public or requester. CaseMine+3pdpjournals.com+311KBW+3
  • Past requests and conduct may be taken into account even if the current request is politely worded. panopticonblog.com+2CaseMine+2
  • The four “broad themes” an authority must (non-exhaustively) consider are: burden on the public authority (including staff), the motive of the requester, the value or serious purpose of what is asked, and any harassment or distress caused to staff. ICO+2pdpjournals.com+2

Alan Dransfield’s Case

Alan Dransfield contends that this precedent has been misused by authorities (including the ICO—the Information Commissioner’s Office) as a blanket tool to suppress FOI and Subject Access Requests, particularly those with uncomfortable questions.

His story:

  • In 2009, he made a FOI request to Devon County Council about lightning protection on a pedestrian bridge. That request, alongside his prior correspondence, was used as the foundation for labeling him “vexatious.”
  • The First-tier Tribunal originally said the new request alone was not vexatious because it was precise and polite, despite his past history. However, higher courts (Upper Tribunal, then Court of Appeal) included his previous history and decided in favour of the authority. This established that even a single polite request could be refused because of past conduct. pdptraining.com+2CaseMine+2
  • The Court of Appeal in 2015 upheld that approach. panopticonblog.com+1

Dransfield now argues that the ICO and courts are using Article 12(5)(b) GDPR and blanket bans on SARs (Subject Access Requests) in ways that are unjustified and beyond what the precedent allows. He is currently pursuing a case in the Upper Tribunal (UA-2024-001149-GIA) for greater transparency and accountability.

What’s at Stake

The implications are serious and wide-ranging:

  • Transparency and accountability: If authorities can refuse any request by labelling the requester “vexatious” based largely on their history, many legitimate and important investigations may be shut down before they begin.
  • Public safety risks: In Dransfield’s case, the original request was about the safety of a public structure. Denying oversight can leave hazards unexamined.
  • Chilling effect: Journalists, campaigners, parents, residents may hesitate to ask questions of public bodies, for fear of being permanently labelled.
  • Legal misuse and lack of candour: Dransfield alleges that the ICO has not been transparent about how it applies these standards, particularly in relation to GDPR subject access requests, and that courts have not sufficiently questioned or limited the precedent.

What Law Says vs. What Dransfield Alleges

  • Legally, the Dransfield precedent does permit taking into account prior behavior, request history, and burden on the public body. But it also sets a high standard of proof for labeling a request vexatious, including consideration of whether the request has public value. 11KBW
  • Dransfield alleges that in practice, authorities are applying the standard in a way that lowers the threshold, effectively banning whole categories of requests or imposing blanket bans, especially on SARs.
  • He also charges that the ICO has failed to show “candour” in its decision-making, omitting or glossing over evidence, and that courts have rubber-stamped refusals without properly balancing public interest, resource burden, or rights under GDPR.

What Can Be Done, and What Dransfield Asks

Alan Dransfield is calling for:

  1. MPs to initiate an inquiry into how Section 14(1) is being used — not just the law as written, but its practical application by the ICO, public authorities, and courts.
  2. Journalists to investigate cases where people have been denied access on vexatious grounds, especially where public safety, corruption, or major failures are involved.
  3. NGOs and campaigners to band together in demanding more transparency, better oversight, and perhaps legislative or judicial reform to clarify what constitutes vexatiousness, and to guard against misuse.

Verdict

The “David” in this battle is not just Alan Dransfield. It is every citizen who believes in the right to know, in oversight, in safety. The “Goliath” is a legal system that, while claiming to uphold transparency, may be turning its own tools into shackles.

Whether this fight will lead to reform—of either law, or practice—remains to be seen. But what Dransfield has done is force the question into the public domain: how far is too far when refusing information?, and who gets to decide.