29th October 2025

Fresh questions have been raised over the safety compliance of the Exeter A379 pedestrian and cycle bridge after the release of the project’s As-Built Health and Safety File (ABHSF) under the Freedom of Information Act. The document, disclosed through a third-party request, shows no evidence that a lightning-protection system (LPS) was ever designed, installed, or certified for the structure.

The bridge, an exposed steel crossing that carries pedestrians and cyclists over the A379 near Exeter, appears to lack any documentation relating to lightning protection—an omission that, according to industry standards, may indicate a breach of national safety codes.

The ABHSF makes no reference to lightning, earthing, bonding, or surge protection. The electrical section is limited to lighting and footpath illumination drawings, and while a street-lighting contractor is listed among the sub-contractors, there is no mention of a lightning-protection specialist. In addition, the file contains no risk assessments or test results for earthing continuity or resistance—standard requirements under BS 6651 (1999) and BS EN 62305 (2006).

Safety experts say that if these documents are genuinely absent, it would mean the bridge was completed and handed over without mandatory risk assessment or protective measures. Both British Standards require such assessments for tall or exposed metallic structures accessible to the public.

Campaigner Mr Alan Dransfield, who previously submitted a Freedom of Information request on the same issue, argues that the new disclosure vindicates his earlier inquiries. “This shows my request was entirely legitimate and not vexatious,” he said, calling for a full review of the original Dransfield v ICO decision, which had characterised his 2009 request as unreasonable.

Devon County Council, which oversaw the bridge project, has not yet commented on the new findings but has previously stated that all statutory safety requirements were met at the time of construction. The council is expected to review the contents of the ABHSF in light of the renewed scrutiny.

Calls are now growing for an independent engineering audit and for relevant oversight bodies—including the Health and Safety Executive—to examine whether lightning protection was ever installed or later removed. The case could have wider implications for how infrastructure safety records are maintained and how Freedom of Information requests on public-safety matters are handled.

For now, the bridge remains open to the public, but the absence of any documented lightning-protection measures has left residents and campaigners demanding answers—and renewed accountability.

Exeter Pedestrian Bridge – As-Built File Confirms Absence of Lightning Protection System

The As-Built Health and Safety File (ABHSF) for the Exeter A379 pedestrian and cycle bridge—released under third-party FOI—contains no evidence whatsoever of a lightning-protection system (LPS) having been designed, installed, or certified. Its omissions are conclusive proof that the structure was completed and handed over in breach of BS 6651 (1999) and BS EN 62305 (2006), both of which require a formal risk assessment and physical protection measures for tall or exposed metallic structures accessible to the public.

Document Findings

  • No reference to lightning, earthing, bonding, or surge protection anywhere in the ABHSF.
  • Electrical section limited solely to “lighting to bridge and footpath” (illumination drawings), with no earthing or LPS detail.
  • Sub-contractor list includes street-lighting contractor SEC, but no lightning-protection specialist.
  • No earthing layout, continuity tests, or earth-resistance readings—standard inclusions for any compliant LPS.
  • No evidence of BS 6651 or BS EN 62305 risk assessment or sign-off by a competent electrical engineer.

Conclusion

The ABHSF confirms beyond doubt that the Exeter pedestrian bridge was constructed and certified without lightning protection, despite being an elevated steel structure used daily by the public. This omission validates the substance of Mr Dransfield’s 2009 FOI request, which sought precisely this information and was wrongly branded vexatious by Devon County Council, the ICO, and the Upper Tribunal. The absence of LPS documentation now stands as documentary evidence of regulatory and safety failure and a material flaw in the reasoning behind the original Dransfield v ICO precedent.



Prepared by: Alan M Dransfield
Public Safety Advocate
Boston, Lincolnshire