31st August 2026
Many problems ran through Stockport Council’s new North Reddish primary school from the start — and a further issue concerning public open space ran alongside them.
The building was deliberately sized too small. In March 2006 officers ordered that it must be limited to 525 places even though projections showed 555–563 children would need places. Temporary classrooms were the planned solution. Birth rates in the area were rising.
The cost nearly doubled before the full contamination story was told. Early estimates of £5.5 million had become £9.94 million by the time the Executive approved the Compulsory Purchase Order in March 2008. Internal notes had already flagged “obvious concern over funding” the previous year, and a November 2007 risk register rated the chance of Environment Agency drainage works exceeding the £200,000 provisional sum as high.
The site was a former industrial tip. Elevated arsenic, lead and asbestos were later confirmed. The chosen clean-up was a clean soil cover system (minimum 400 mm) across play areas, localised asbestos removal, and gas membranes in the buildings.
The access arrangements created predictable traffic danger. Residents warned early that many homes would have to leave via narrow Mill Lane past the school entrance. After the school opened, Council officers recorded serious traffic-management problems and Reddish Police contacted the authority to express safety concerns.
Finally, the large public open space that had existed on the field was largely replaced. A 1982 Section 52 Agreement had required seven acres to be set aside for public recreation. In April 2009 the Executive Member for Children & Young People stated that none of that protected land was included in the school CPO. The finished school provided a fenced pitch with managed public access and playgrounds that satisfied minimum Sport England requirements, but the previous unrestricted public playing field was lost and overall open space on the site was substantially reduced.
The school eventually opened, but only after years of delay, a sharply higher bill, a constrained capacity, a cover-system remediation of contaminated ground, post-opening safety measures on the surrounding roads, and the conversion of a large public open space into school grounds. The contemporary documents — internal emails, Project Board minutes, FOI replies, verification reports, the 2009 open-space letter and the post-opening traffic report — show that each of these difficulties was visible, in whole or in part, well before the final decisions were locked in.
